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Lower-Cost -Private Information Retrieval
Abstract: Private Information Retrieval (PIR), despite
being well studied, is computationally costly and ar-
duous to scale. We explore lower-cost relaxations of
information-theoretic PIR, based on dummy queries,
sparse vectors, and compositions with an anonymity
system. We prove the security of each scheme using
a flexible differentially private definition for private
queries that can capture notions of imperfect privacy.
We show that basic schemes are weak, but some of them
can be made arbitrarily safe by composing them with
large anonymity systems.
Keywords: Private Information Retrieval, Anonymous
communications, Private Queries, Differential Privacy
1 Introduction
Despite many years of research and significant advances,
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) still suffers from
scalability issues that were identified some time ago [29]:
both information theoretic [10] (IT-PIR) and computa-
tional [24] PIR schemes require database servers to op-
erate on all records for each private query to conceal the
sought record. Thus, as the database grows, the time to
process each query grows linearly in theory, and super-
linearly in practice: as the data processed exceeds the
CPU cache, it has to be fetched from the main memory
and eventually persistent storage. Furthermore, in IT-
PIR each query is processed by multiple PIR servers.
As the number of servers increases, so do the communi-
cation and computation costs.
Yet the need to privately access large public
databases is pressing: for example Certificate Trans-
parency [20], which strengthens TLS certificate issuing,
requires clients to look up certificates for sites they have
visited, resulting in privacy concerns. The current size
of the certificate database precludes trivial download-
ing of the entire set and requires PIR [21], but it cannot
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scale to the ubiquitous use of TLS in the future. More
scalable systems are therefore needed, even at the cost
of lowering the quality of protection1. Similarly, as the
Tor network [12] grows it becomes untenable to broad-
cast information about all servers to all clients, and a
private querying mechanism [22] will have to be imple-
mented to prevent attacks based on partial knowledge
of the network [11].
To address this challenge, we present designs that
lower the traditional PIR costs, but leak more informa-
tion to adversaries. Quantifying that leakage is there-
fore necessary and we propose a game-based differen-
tial privacy definition [13] to evaluate and minimize
the risk introduced. This definition can also be used to
demonstrate the inadequacy of folk designs for private
queries: in the first design, a client queries an untrusted
database by looking up the sought record along with
other ‘dummy’ records [5, 17, 19] to confuse the ad-
versary; in the second design, a client fetches a record
from an untrusted database through an anonymity sys-
tem [12, 14] to hide the correspondence between the
client and the server.
The contributions of this paper are:
– We present and motivate a flexible differential
privacy-based PIR definition, through a simple ad-
versary distinguishability game, to analyze lighter-
weight protocols and estimate their risk. This is nec-
essary to quantify leakage, but can also capture sys-
tems that are arbitrarily private, including compu-
tationally and unconditionally private schemes.
– We argue that simple private retrieval systems using
dummies and anonymous channels are not secure
under this definition. A number of proposed systems
have made use of such private query mechanisms,
and we show they can lead to catastrophic loss of
privacy when the adversary has side information.
– We present a number of variants of PIR schemes
that satisfy our definition, and compare their secu-
rity and cost. Our key result is that their composi-
tion with an anonymity system can achieve arbitrar-
1 The privacy offered today by Certificate Transparency is sim-
ply to have clients download a range of certificates instead of
just one. See below for our analysis of this naive dummy re-
quests mechanism.
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ily good levels of privacy, leading to highly secure
alternatives to traditional PIR schemes.
– As a means to achieving the above we present a
generic composition theorem of differentially private
systems with anonymity channels, which is of inde-
pendent interest.
– We present an optimization to reduce PIR costs and
speed up an IT-PIR scheme by contacting fewer
databases, and evaluate it using a Chor-like scheme
as an example.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present
related work on PIR, anonymity systems, and the uses
of differential privacy in the remainder of this section.
After introducing the paper’s notations, we define the
threat model and present the privacy definitions in sec-
tion 2. We then demonstrate why the use of dummies
and anonymity system alone does not guarantee pri-
vacy under our definitions in section 3 and present our
-private designs and an optimization to cut the com-
putation cost in sections 4 and 5. Finally in section 6,
we discuss the costs and efficiency of the designs before
concluding the paper in section 7.
1.1 Related Work
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) was introduced in
1995 by Chor et al. [10] to enable private access to
public database records. As initially proposed, PIR pro-
vided information-theoretic privacy protection (IT-PIR)
but required multiple non-collaborating servers each
with a copy of the database. Later, Computational PIR
(CPIR) [24] was proposed using a single server, but its
practicality has been questioned as being slower than
simply downloading the entire database at typical net-
work speeds [29]. Since that time, however, newer CPIR
schemes that are significantly faster than download-
ing the entire database have been proposed [1, 2, 23].
While IT-PIR offers perfect privacy—the confidential-
ity of the query cannot be breached even with unlimited
resources—it is still a computational burden on multiple
databases, since all records must be processed for each
query and by each server. IT-PIR has been gradually en-
hanced over time with new capabilities, such as batch
processing [18], multi-block queries [15] and tolerance to
misbehaving servers [6]. Alternative approaches to scal-
ing PIR include using trusted hardware elements [4].
Research on Anonymity Systems (AS) began in
1981 by David Chaum introducing the mixnet for
anonymous e-mail [9]. Other AS applications were then
studied, such as peer-to-peer and web browsing, in par-
ticular in the context of Onion Routing and Tor [12].
The Anonymity System accepts a batch of messages and
routes them while hiding the correspondence between
senders and receivers. Low-latency anonymity systems,
however, may still fail under attacks such as traffic anal-
ysis and fingerprinting [30]. Cascade mix networks offer
perfect privacy at the cost of lower performance [7]. In
this work we will always consider an ideal anonymity
system that can be abstracted, from the perspective of
an adversary, as an unknown random permutation of in-
put messages to output messages. Real-world instantia-
tions are imperfect and security parameters may have to
be adapted, or in the case of onion routing systems [12]
some additional batching and mixing may be required.
Differential Privacy definitions and mechanisms
were first presented in 2006 [13] to enable safe inter-
actions with statistical databases. However, this def-
inition has since been used in machine learning [28],
cloud computing [25], and location indistinguishability
together with PIR [3] to evaluate and minimize the pri-
vacy risk. Differentially private definitions have several
advantages: they capture the intrinsic loss of privacy due
to using a mechanism, and they are not affected by side
information the adversary may hold. Well-known com-
position theorems can be applied. We note that Chor
et al. [10] also make passing allusion to statistical and
leaky definitions of PIR in their seminal paper, only to
focus on perfectly information-theoretic schemes.
2 Definitions and -Privacy
In this work we characterize as PIR any system where
a user inputs a secret index of a record in a public
database, and eventually is provided with this record,
without a defined adversary learning the index. We note
that the systems we propose use different mechanisms
from traditional IT-PIR and CPIR, and make different
security assumptions. Yet they provide the same func-
tionality and interface, and in many cases can be used
as drop-in replacements for traditional PIR.
2.1 Notation
Entities. All systems we explore allow u users U , i ∈J1, uK, to perform q queries by sending p requests to the
database system DS. A database system DS is com-
posed of d ∈ N replicated databases DBi∈J1,dK. Each
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of them stores the same n records of standardized size
b bits. We assume a cascade mix network provides an
anonymous channel all users can access. We abstract
this Anonymity System as one secure sub-system pro-
viding a perfectly secret bi-directional permutation be-
tween input and output messages.
When presenting mechanisms not using the
anonymity system we will simply present the interac-
tions of a single user with the database servers, and
assume that all user queries can be answered by trivial
parallel composition. However, when reasoning about
PIR systems using an anonymity system, all user queries
are assumed to transit though the anonymous channel.
Costs. This work studies PIR scalability, and we fo-
cus on analyzing costs on the server side, which is the
performance bottleneck of current techniques. We de-
note the communication cost as Cm corresponding to
the number of record blocks sent to the user by DS. The
computation cost Cp corresponds to the sum, for each
record accessed, of the record access cost and the pro-
cessing cost by the servers (e.g., the number of XORs),
Cp = Nrecord access · (cacc + cprc).
2.2 Privacy Definition
Threat Model. We consider an adversary A has cor-
rupted da databases, out of d, in order to discover the
queries of a target user Ut. These corrupted servers
passively record and share all requests they observe to
achieve this objective. We also assume that the adver-
sary observes all the user’s incoming and outgoing com-
munication. However, in all presented systems, the users
encrypt their requests with the servers’ public keys, and
we assume that for communication with honest servers,
only message timing, volume and size are ultimately
visible to the adversary. Similarly, using standard mix
cascade techniques [7], we assume the adversary can-
not distinguish the correspondences of input and out-
put messages through an anonymity system. We also
assume that the other u − 1 users in the system are
honest, in that they will not provide the adversary any
of the secrets they generate or use. However, the ad-
versary also knows the distribution of their queries—an
assumption that is necessary to model attacks based on
side or background information.
Security Definitions. We define (,δ)-privacy as a
flexible privacy metric to fully capture weaker as well as
strong privacy-friendly search protocols. The definition
relies on the following game between the adversary and
honest users: an adversary provides a target user Ut with
two queries Qi and Qj , and to all other users, U \ Ut, a
single distinct query Q0. The target Ut selects one of the
two queries, and uses the PIR system in order to execute
it, and all others execute Q0, leading to the adversary
observing a trace of events O. This trace includes all
information from corrupt servers and all metadata of
encrypted communications from the network. We then
define privacy as follows:
Privacy Definition 1. A protocol provides (, δ)-
private PIR if there are non-negative constants  and
δ, such that for any possible adversary-provided queries
Qi, Qj, and Q0, and for all possible adversarial obser-
vations O in the observation space Ω we have that
Pr(O|Qi) ≤ e · Pr(O|Qj) + δ.
In the important special case where δ = 0 we call the
stronger property -privacy, and can also define the like-
lihood ratio L:
Privacy Definition 2. The likelihood ratio of a par-
ticular observation O in an -private PIR scheme is de-
fined by: Pr(O|Qi)/Pr(O|Qj) ≤ e, and the likelihood
ratio of the scheme itself is the maximal such value:
L = max
Qi,Qj ,Q0,O
Pr(O|Qi)
Pr(O|Qj) ≤ e
.
These definitions combine aspects of game-based cryp-
tographic definitions and also differential privacy. We
first note how the target user Ut may chose either Qi
or Qj with arbitrary a-priori probability, rather than at
random. The prior preference between those does not
affect Pr(O|Qi) or Pr(O|Qj) that relate to the quan-
tity to be bounded, making this definition independent
of the adversary’s prior knowledge of the target user’s
query.
Similarly the defined security game assumes that
the adversary knows precisely the queries of all users
except the target (U \ Ut), thus capturing any suscep-
tibility to side information they would have about the
queries of other users. We note that while users are pro-
vided with adversarial queries, the adversary does not
learn either any user secrets created as part of the PIR
protocols or the user requests sent to honest database
servers.
Generality and necessity of definition. In the
preferable case δ = 0, the likelihood ratio of any ob-
servation is bounded, and we can therefore cap privacy
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leakage in all cases. A non-zero δ denotes cases where
the leakage may be unbounded: events catastrophic to
privacy may occur with probability at most δ. In those
cases, requiring δ to be a negligible function yields the
traditional computational cryptographic definitions.
In the case  = 0, we recover the cryptographic def-
inition of indistinguishability. The traditional uncondi-
tional security provided by IT-PIR is equivalent to a
mechanism with  = 0. For  > 0 information about the
query selected leaks at a non-negligible rate, and users
should rate-limit recurring or correlated queries as for
other differentially private mechanisms [13].
Thus we lose no generality by using this definition: it
can capture information-theoretic PIR systems, compu-
tational PIR systems, as well as systems that leak more
information. In the rest of the paper we will define such
leaky systems, making this relaxed definition necessary;
we will also show that the composition of an -private
PIR mechanism with an anonymity system can lead to
systems that provide arbitrarily good privacy.
As for the original differential privacy definition, the
-private PIR definition (with δ = 0) ensures that there
is no observation providing the adversary certainty to
include or exclude any queries from the a-priori query
set. When a PIR system does not provide such a guar-
antee there exist observations that allow the adversary
to exclude candidate queries with certainty, leading to
poor composition under repeated queries, as studied in
the next section. Furthermore, the composition of non
-private PIR schemes with an anonymity channel is not
guaranteed to approach perfect privacy as it may leak
a lot of information to an adversary with side informa-
tion about the target, or knowledge about the queries
performed by other users.
3 Non -Private Systems
In this section we analyze two approaches to achieving
query privacy that we show are not -private. We also
examine their properties for extreme and impractical
security parameters as well as when they are composed
with an anonymity system.
We note that the literature does not refer to those as
“Private Information Retrieval” or PIR, reserving this
term for information theoretically and computationally
secure schemes. Yet these ad-hoc systems fulfill the same
privacy and functional role as PIR: they are used to
lookup a record privately out of a public database, at
a lower cost compared with IT-PIR or CPIR. Thus we
examine them, analyze their properties, and use some of
their ideas as ingredients to build more robust low-cost
systems.
3.1 Naive Dummy Requests
A number of works attempt to hide a true user query to
a single untrusted database, by hiding it among a num-
ber p of artificially generated user queries (‘dummies’)
to achieve some privacy; for example OB-PWS [5] in the
context of web search, and Hong and Landay [17] and
Kido et al. [19] in the context of private location queries.
Zhao et al. propose a dummy-based privacy mechanism
for DNS lookups [31], but Hermann et al. find its secu-
rity lacking [16]. It is interesting to note that both loca-
tion and DNS applications involve large databases mak-
ing traditional PIR prohibitively expensive. We show
that this mechanism is not -private, leading occasion-
ally to spectacular information leaks as reported.
Algorithm 3.1: Naive Dummy Requests (User)
Input: Query Q (0 ≤ Q < n);
Security parameter p (p > 1);
1 Req ← {Q};
2 while |Req| < p do
3 Q′ ← random(n);
4 Req ← Req ∪Q′;
5 forall the r ∈ Req do
6 (indexr, recr)← sendreceive(DS, r);
7 return recQ;
The function random(n) samples uniformly an in-
teger from 0 to n− 1, and sendreceive(D,m) sends a
message m to D, and returns any response from D.
Vulnerability Theorem 1. The Naive Dummy Re-
quests mechanism for security parameter p < n is not
-private.
Proof. The adversary controlling the database observes
which records are queried. Without loss of generality,
in case the user queries for Qi, with some probabil-
ity A does not see the query requesting record j : Qj .
We denote by Pr(O|Qi) the probability an adversary
A observes a trace of events O knowing the query Qi
was sent. Thereby, as the adversary has not seen the
query Qj in the current observation O, the adversary
knows the record j was not sought by the user, hence
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Pr(O|Qj) = 0. Consequently, there is no  such that
Pr(O|Qi)/Pr(O|Qj) ≤ e. As the -privacy bound must
apply for any observation O, and requests Qi and Qj ,
this counter example shows that the use of dummies
alone does not guarantee -privacy.
Practically, this means that if p < n, the adversary ob-
serving the database system DS will be able to learn,
with perfect certainty, that records that have not been
requested are not the sought record Q. Thus, this mech-
anism is not -private, until p = n at which point it be-
comes perfectly private ( = 0) and corresponds to the
naive download of the full database.
This weakness has practical implications: in the case
of a location privacy mechanism an adversary learns
which locations a user is not in with certainty, and in
the context of DNS lookups, which domains are not be-
ing requested. If using this naive scheme in the context
of DP5 [8], a system using PIR to protect users’ so-
cial networks, an adversary would learn with certainty
which social links are not present at each query.
3.2 Naive Anonymous Requests
Sending a query through an anonymity system has
been proposed to maintain privacy against an untrusted
database: the seminal Tor system [12] supports private
queries to websites, but also performs anonymous re-
quests as a way to resolve dot-onion addresses to ren-
dezvous points. Privé [14] uses an anonymity system to
query location-based services, and another proposal to
perform private search engine queries [26]. However, this
technique alone does not provide -private PIR.
Algorithm 3.2: Naive Anon. Request (User)
Input: Query Q (0 ≤ Q < n);
1 (indexQ, recQ)← anonsendreceive(DS,Q);
2 return recQ;
In this mechanism users simply send requests for the
records they seek to the database service through a bi-
directional anonymity channel, allowing for anonymous
replies (the anonsendreceive function). Upon receiv-
ing an anonymous request for a record, the database
server simply sends the record back to the user though
the anonymous channel. The hope is that since multiple
queries are mixed together, the exact query of the target
user is obscured. However, there is significant leakage
and the mechanism in not -private.
Vulnerability Theorem 2. The Naive Anonymous
Requests mechanism is not -private, for any number
of users u using the system.
Proof. Following our game-based definition for -
privacy non-target clients’ queries are provided by the
adversary and are all Q0. Thus the adversary will ob-
serve one of Qi or Qj only, and all other requests will be
for Q0. For the record Qx, x ∈ {i, j} that is not queried,
the probability Pr(O|Qx) equals zero, and the likelihood
ratio L goes to infinity. Thus there exists no  that may
bound this likelihood.
The proof relies heavily on the fact that the adversary
provides all non-target users with a known query Q0
and is therefore able to filter those out at the corrupt
database server, and uncover trivially the target user’s
query. This is an extreme model; however, it also covers
realistic attacks. For example, if the adversary knows
that most other users are not going to access either Qi
or Qj , but suspects that the target user might, a single
observation can confirm this suspicion. This could be
the case, for example, when users attempt to look up
unpopular, or even personal records that only concern,
and are accessed by, the target. The fact that the se-
curity parameter of the system, namely the number of
users, does not affect security is particularly damning.
3.3 Composing Naive Mechanisms
Interestingly, the composition of the two naive mech-
anisms, namely when multiple users perform Naive
Dummy Requests through an anonymous channel, for
any p > 1, the mechanism becomes (, δ)-private. This
simply involves replacing the sendreceivemethod with
an anonymous channel anonsendreceive in the Naive
Dummy Requests algorithm. As the number of users u
increases the probability δ any record is requested zero
or u times exactly becomes negligible and then there
exists an  that satisfies the definition.
More specifically, in our indistinguishability game
scenario, the probability the adversary observes exactly
u queries Qi is bounded above by δu ≤
(
p−1
n−1
)u−1 while
the probability they receive no Qi queries is bounded
above by δ0 ≤
(
n−p
n−1
)u−1. (The proof can be found in
Appendix A.1.) This requires a large number of users
u or volume of dummies p to provide meaningful pri-
vacy against the single corrupt server. For this reason
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we instead explore multi-server mechanisms in the next
sections.
4 Four -Private PIR Systems
4.1 Direct Requests
The first -private PIR mechanism uses dummy queries
on multiple PIR databases, of which da are adversar-
ial and (d− da) are honest. The user generates a query
for the sought record, along with p − 1 random (dis-
tinct) other ones. The requests are partitioned into sets
of equal size and sent to the PIR databases directly.
Each database then responds with the list of records
requested, encrypted as are all communications.
Algorithm 4.1: Direct Requests (User)
Input:
Q: (0 ≤ Q < n);
p: (p > 1) ∧ p ≡ 0 mod d;
1 Req ← {Q};
2 while |Req| < p do
3 Q′ ← random(n);
4 if Q′ 6∈ Req then
5 Req ← Req ∪Q′;
6 for 1 ≤ i ≤ d do
7 for 1 ≤ j ≤ p/d do
8 r ← pop(Req)
(indexr, recr)← sendreceive(DBi, r);
9 return recQ;
The database servers simply respond to requests by
returning the index and the records sought over the en-
crypted channel. pop(Req) returns items from the set
Req independently of the order they were inserted; for
example, it could return the smallest item (and also re-
moves it from Req). recQ is the sought record of index
Q.
Security Theorem 1. The direct requests mechanism
is an -private PIR mechanism with
 = ln
(
1
d− da ·
(
d · n− 1
p− 1 − da
))
,
where d is the number of databases, of which da are ad-
versarial, n is the total number of records, and p is the
total number of queries sent by the user.
10-1
100
101
102
100 101 102 103 104 105 106
ε
p
da=d-1
da=0.90*d
da=0.50*d
da=0.10*d
Fig. 1. Direct requests:  versus p,
for d = 100 and n = 106.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Costs. For the Direct Request algorithm, as p records
are requested and sent back to the user the communi-
cation cost is Cm = p. As the databases do not XOR
any records but just accesses and sends them, the com-
putation cost is Cp = p · cacc.
Practical values. Fig. 1 illustrates Direct Request
curves representing  as a function of p for different ad-
versaries in the reference scenario of Certificate Trans-
parency. As millions of certificates have already been
recorded in databases and hundreds of databases are
supposed to be running all over the world, we have set
n = 106 and d = 102 and assumed p = 10 · d. The
security parameter  starts above 10 and slowly dimin-
ishes until nearly all of the records have been requested
where the curves follow the vertical asymptote p = n.
If weaker adversaries decrease  for any p, the differ-
ence becomes really noticeable only after requesting a
tenth of the records. Further, in order to achieve even a
mediocre security of  < 1, for any da, more than 910 of
the records have to be requested. In the worst-case sce-
nario where only one database is not colluding, we find
the security parameter  is approximately equal to 11.5.
However if only half of the databases are corrupted, i.e.
da = 12 · d, we have  ≈ 7.6. To summarize for n = 106,
d = 102 and p = 10 · d, if da = d − 1 we have  ≈ 11.5
while if da = d2 , we have  ≈ 7.6. For any da, to obtain
 < 1, p > 910 · n.
In the case of a small database system consisting
of a few to tens of databases, each storing thousands of
records, we set n = 103 and d = 10. When the adversary
controls all databases but one, if the user only sends
one request per database we have that  ≈ 7 while when
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half of the databases are corrupted, da = 12 · d, we have
 ≈ 5.4. To summarize for n = 103, d = 10 and p = d, if
da = d−1 we have  ≈ 7 while if da = d2 , we have  ≈ 5.4.
The above examples illustrate that for large
databases, as the one considered in the motivating Cer-
tificate Transparency example, an adversary control-
ling about half the databases can extract a lot of in-
formation. Furthermore, information leakage does not
diminish significantly based on the security parameter
p, or for smaller databases. Thus we conclude the Di-
rect Requests mechanism alone provides very weak pri-
vacy; however, we will show how its composition with
an anonymity system can improve its performance.
4.2 Anonymous direct requests
Bundled anonymous request
We compose the direct requests mechanism from the
previous subsection with an anonymous channel. Each
user, including the target user Ut, sends a bundle of re-
quests defined by the direct requests PIR mechanism to
databases through an anonymity system AS.
The requests are bundled, in that all requests from
a specific user are linkable with each other, allowing
this mechanism to be implemented by sending a sin-
gle anonymous message through the AS per user. The
AS’s exit node receiving the bundle forwards the differ-
ent sets of queries (as usual, encrypted by the user to
each respective database) to the relevant database and
anonymously returns the requested records from each
database.
The increased privacy of this scheme derives from
the ability of the target user Ut to hide the use of the
PIR system amongst u − 1 other users. This strength-
ens the direct requests mechanism hiding Ut’s query
amongst p − 1 random requests throughout d servers.
The adversary’s task becomes harder as any bundle, out
of u, could be the target’s, and any query, out of p, the
correct one.
The database servers simply respond to bundles by
returning the index and the records sought over the en-
crypted channel, the anonymity system forwarding the
answer to the corresponding users.
Security Theorem 2. The bundled anonymous re-
quests mechanism is -private with
 = ln
((
d
d− da ·
n− 1
p− 1 −
da
d− da
)2
+ u− 1
)
− lnu.
Algorithm 4.2: Bundled Anonymous Requests
(User)
Input:
Q: (0 ≤ Q < n);
p: (p > 1) ∧ p ≡ 0 mod d;
1 Req ← {Q};
2 while |Req| < p do
3 Q′ ← random(n);
4 if Q′ 6∈ Req then
5 Req ← Req ∪Q′;
6 Bundle← {}
7 for 1 ≤ i ≤ d do
8 for 1 ≤ j ≤ p/d do
9 Bundlei ← pop(Req)
10 Bundle← (DBi, Bundlei)
11 (indexr, recr)←
anonsendreceive(DS,Bundle);
12 return recQ;
Proof. By the application of our Composition Lemma
(see below), and the security parameter of the direct
requests mechanism.
Costs. As the only differences with the Direct request
case is the Anonymity system and the bundling of the
messages, we find the same values for the communica-
tion costs Cm = p and the computation cost Cp = p·cacc.
Separated anonymous request
We may also compose the direct requests mechanism
(Sect. 4.1) with an anonymous channel in a different
manner. Each user, including the target user Ut, sends
distinct requests defined by the direct requests PIR
mechanism to databases through an anonymity system
AS, whose queries are unlinkable at the mix output.
The requests are separated, in that all requests from
a specific user are unlinkable with each other, allow-
ing this mechanism to be implemented by sending sep-
arate anonymous messages through the AS to different
databases. The AS’s exit node receiving the message
forwards it to the relevant database and anonymously
returns the requested record.
The increased privacy of this scheme derives from
the ability of the target user Ut to hide the real query of
the PIR system amongst u·(p−1) other random queries.
This strengthens the direct requests mechanism hiding
Ut’s query amongst u ·p−1 random requests throughout
d servers.
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Algorithm 4.3: Separated Anonymous Requests
(User)
Input:
Q: (0 ≤ Q < n);
p: (1 < p) ∧ p ≡ 0 mod d;
1 Req ← {Q};
2 while |Req| < p do
3 Q′ ← random(0, n);
4 if Q′ 6∈ Req then
5 Req ← Req ∪Q′;
6 forall the i ∈ p do
7 r ← pop(Req);
8 (indexr, recr)←
anonsendreceive(DSrandom(d), r);
9 return recQ;
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
102
100 101 102 103 104 105 106
DRε
p
da=d-1
da=0.9*d
da=0.5*d
da=0.1*d
Fig. 2. AS-Bundle:  versus p,
for d = 100, n = 106 and u = 103.
Since the Bundled Anonymous Requests mecha-
nism leaks strictly more information than Separated
Anonymous Request, the bundle is also an upper bound
of the Separated Anonymous Request.
Costs. As this method is similar with the Bundled case,
we have for costs Cm = p and Cp = p · cacc. However,
the load on the anonymity system increases as there are
u · p anonymous messages transmitted.
Practical values. Fig. 2 shows Direct Request com-
posed with anonymity system curves representing  as
a function of p for different adversaries in the reference
scenario of Certificate Transparency. As before, we set
n = 106 and d = 102 and assumed p = 10 · d and
u = 103. The security parameter  starts above 10 and
slowly diminishes until a tenth to most of the records
have been recorded depending on da where the curves
follow the vertical asymptote p = n. The anonymity sys-
tem gain in privacy can be seen under the line indicating
where the privacy of the Direct Request protocol, with-
out an anonymity system, stops for the same amount of
points. If the anonymity system gains appear negative
at the beginning of the curves, this is due to the lack
of tightness of the bound in the Composition Lemma.
If weaker adversaries decrease  for any p, the differ-
ence becomes really noticeable only after requesting a
hundredth of the records. Further, in order to achieve
even a mediocre security of  < 1, for any da, at most
half of the records have to be requested compared to
90% without an anonymity system. In the worst-case
scenario where only one database is not colluding, we
find the security parameter  is approximately equal to
16. However if only half of the databases are corrupted,
i.e. da = 12 ·d, we have  ≈ 8. To summarize for n = 106,
d = 102, u = 103 and p = 10 · d, if da = d − 1 we have
 ≈ 16 while if da = d2 , we have  ≈ 8.
In the case of a small database system managing
a few to tens of databases, each storing thousands of
records, we again set n = 103 and d = 10. When the
adversary controls all databases but one, each sending
only one request per database, we have that  ≈ 7 while
when half of the databases are corrupted, da = 12 · d, we
have  ≈ 4. To summarize for n = 103, d = 10, u = 103
and p = d, if da = d− 1 we have  ≈ 7 while if da = d2 ,
we have  ≈ 4.
We conclude that direct requests through an
anonymity system is a stronger mechanism that di-
rect requests alone. However, for very large databases,
such as the one expected in Certificate Transparency,
the quality of protection is still low. It becomes bet-
ter only as the total volume of requests from all users
is in the order of magnitude of the number of records
in the database. This requires either a large number of
users, or a large number of dummy requests per user.
However, even the weaker protection afforded by anony-
mous direct requests may be sufficient to protect privacy
in applications where records only need to be accessed
infrequently.
4.3 Sparse-PIR
We next adapt Chor’s simplest IT-PIR scheme [10] to
reduce the number of database records accessed to an-
swer each query. As a reminder: in Chor’s scheme the
user builds a set of random binary vectors of length n
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(the number of records in the database), one for each
server; we call these vectors the “request vectors”. These
are constructed so that their element-wise XOR yields
a zero for all non-queried records, and a one for the
record sought (we call this the “query vector”). Each
server simply XORs all records corresponding to a 1 in
its request vector, and returns this value to the user.
The XOR of all responses corresponds to the sought
record.
Sparse-PIR aims to reduce the computational load
on the database servers DBi. To this end the binary re-
quest vectors are not sampled uniformly but are sparse,
requiring the database servers to access and XOR fewer
records to answer each query. Specifically, in Sparse-PIR
each request is derived by independently selecting each
binary element using a Bernoulli distribution with pa-
rameter θ ≤ 1/2. Furthermore, the constraint that the
XOR of these sparse vectors yields the query vector is
maintained. The intuition is that we will build a d × n
query matrix M column wise: each column (of length
d) corresponds to one record in the database, and will
be selected by performing d independent Bernoulli trials
with parameter θ, re-sampling if necessary to ensure the
sum of the entries in the column (the Hamming weight)
is even for non-queried records, or odd for the single
queried record.
Equivalently, we may first select a Hamming weight
for each column with the appropriate probability de-
pending on d, θ, and whether the column represents
the queried record or not, and then select a uniformly
random vector of length d with that Hamming weight.
Each row of the query matrix will then have expected
Hamming weight θ · n, and the rows of the matrix (the
request vectors) will XOR to the desired query vector,
namely all 0 except a single 1 at the desired location.
The database logic in Sparse-PIR is identical to the
logic in Chor’s IT-PIR: each database server receives
a binary vector, XORs all records that correspond to
entries with a 1, and responds with the result. In fact
the database may be agnostic to the fact it is processing
a sparse PIR request, aside from the reduction in the
number of entires to be XORed. For θ < 0.5 the costs
of processing at each database is lowered due to the
relative sparsity of ones, at no additional networking or
other costs.
Security Theorem 3. The Sparse-PIR mechanism is
-private with
 = 4 · arctanh[(1− 2θ)(d−da)],
Algorithm 4.4: Sparse-PIR (User)
Input:
Q: 0 ≤ Q < n;
θ: 0 < θ ≤ 12 ;
1 M ← [ ];
2 for 0 ≤ col < n do
3 if col = Q then
4 q ← d Bernoulli(θ) trials with Odd sum;
5 else
6 q ← d Bernoulli(θ) trials with Even sum;
7 M ←M append column q;
8 for 1 ≤ i ≤ d do
9 ri ← row i of M ;
10 respi ← sendreceive(DBi, ri);
11 return
⊕
1≤i≤d respi;
where θ is the parameter of the Bernoulli distribution
and d−da represents the number of honest PIR servers.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
As expected when θ = 1/2 the privacy provided by the
Sparse-PIR mechanism is the same as for the perfect
IT-PIR mechanism. This fact can be derived from the
tight bound on  by observing that  equals zero when
θ = 1/2.
Security Lemma 1. For θ = 1/2, and at least one
honest server, the Sparse-PIR mechanism provides per-
fect privacy, namely with  = 0.
More interestingly, as the number of honest servers in-
creases, the privacy of the Sparse-PIR increases for any
θ, and in the limit becomes perfect as in standard IT-
PIR:
Security Lemma 2. For an increasing number of
honest servers (d − da) → ∞ the Sparse-PIR mecha-
nism approaches perfect privacy, namely → 0.
Proof. Note that for 0 < θ < 1, limx→∞(1 − 2θ)x = 0.
Thus for (d − da) → ∞ we have that  → 0, since
arctanh(0) = 0.
Costs. In Sparse-PIR, only θ · n records are accessed
and operated on per request, and d of those are sent.
We thus have Cm = d and Cp = θ · d · n · (cacc + cprc).
Practical values. Fig. 3 shows Sparse-PIR curves rep-
resenting  as a function of θ for different adversaries in
the reference scenario of Certificate Transparency with
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Fig. 3. Sparse-PIR:  versus θ for d = 100.
d = 102. The security parameter  starts below 10 and
slowly diminishes until nearly all of the records have
been accessed for θ = 12 where the curves follow a ver-
tical asymptote. The difference in  for different adver-
saries is noticeable at any point of the curves. In order
to achieve even a mediocre security of  < 1, except
for the worst case da = d − 1, accessing 10% of the
records at each database is enough. In the worst-case
scenario where only one database is not colluding, we
find the security parameter  is approximately equal to
2 for θ = 0.25. However if only half of the databases are
corrupted, i.e. da = 12 ·d, we have  ≈ 10−15 for the same
θ. To summarize for d = 102 and θ = 0.25, if da = d− 1
we have  ≈ 2 while if da = d2 , we have  ≈ 10−15.
In the case of a small database systems managing
a few to tens of databases, we set d = 10. When the
adversary controls all databases but one, we have the
 ≈ 2 while when half of the databases are corrupted,
da = 12 · d, we have  ≈ 10−1. To summarize for d = 10
and θ = 0.25, if da = d − 1 we have  ≈ 2 while if
da = d2 , we have  ≈ 10−1.
A sparse version of the simple Chor scheme can in-
deed protect the user’s privacy better than the direct
request, as we can observe a factor of 9 between the two
epsilons. Yet, in the worst-case scenario, where the ad-
versary controls all the databases except one, the risk
is still significant: the adversary infers that the user is
about 7 times more likely to seek a particular record
over another. Thus we consider strengthening the sys-
tem through composition with an anonymous channel.
4.4 Anonymous Sparse-PIR
We consider the composition of the Sparse-PIR mecha-
nism with an anonymity system. In this setting, a num-
ber of users u select their queries to the database servers,
and perform them anonymously through an anonymity
system. We consider that all requests from the same
user are linkable to each other at the input and output
of the anonymity system. As per our standard setting,
the adversary provides a target user Ut with queries Qi
and Qj , one of which the user choses, and all other u−1
users with Q0. They all use an arbitrary -private PIR
mechanism through an anonymity channel to perform
their respective queries.
Algorithm 4.5: Anonymous Sparse-PIR (User)
Input:
Q: 0 ≤ Q < n;
θ: 0 < θ ≤ 12 ;
1 M ← [ ];
2 for 0 ≤ col < n do
3 if col = Q then
4 q ← d Bernoulli(θ) trials with Odd sum;
5 else
6 q ← d Bernoulli(θ) trials with Even sum;
7 M ←M append column q;
8 for 1 ≤ i ≤ d do
9 ri ← row i of M ;
10 respi ← anonsendreceive(DBi, ri);
11 return
⊕
1≤i≤d respi;
We will show that this mechanism is -private,
through first proving a general composition lemma. This
could be of independent interest to designers of private
query systems based on anonymous channels.
Composition Lemma. The composition of an ar-
bitrary 1-private PIR mechanism with a perfect
anonymity system used by u users, for sufficiently large
u, yields an 2-private PIR mechanism with:
2 = ln(e21 + u− 1)− lnu.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. Note this is not a worst-case
analysis, but an average-case analysis. Namely there is
a negligible probability in u, the number of users in
the anonymity system, this does not hold. A fuller (,
δ)-privacy definition could capture the worst-case be-
haviour.
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Fig. 4. AS-Sparse-PIR:  versus θ for d = 100 and u = 103.
It is easy to show that as u→∞, the parameter 2 → 0,
leading to a perfect IT-PIR mechanism, independently
of the value of 1 (so long as it is finite). Conversely,
when u = 1, we have 2 = 21 (the loss of a factor of 2
is due to the lack of tightness of the bound). Using this
lemma, we can prove our main theorem.
Security Theorem 4. The composition of the Sparse-
PIR scheme with parameters θ, d, and da with an
anonymity system with u users is also -private with
security parameter
 = ln
((
1 + (1− 2θ)(d−da)
1− (1− 2θ)(d−da)
)4
+ u− 1
)
− lnu.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the Composition
Lemma, the security parameter of Sparse-PIR, and the
definition of arctanh.
Cost The use of an anonymity system does not change
any of the server-side costs. The communication costs
remain Cm = d and the computation costs remain
Cp = θ · d · n · (cacc + cprc).
Practical values. Fig. 4 shows Sparse-PIR composed
with anonymity system curves representing  as a func-
tion of θ for different adversaries in the reference sce-
nario of Certificate Transparency, with d = 102 and
u = 103. The security parameter  starts below 10 and
slowly diminishes until nearly all of the records have
been accessed for θ = 12 where the curves follow a verti-
cal asymptote. If the anonymity system gains appear
negative at the beginning of the curves, this is due
to the lack of tightness of the bound in the Compo-
sition Lemma. The difference in  for different adver-
sary is noticeable at any point of the curves. In order
to achieve even a mediocre security of  < 1, except for
the worst case da = d − 1, accessing more than 10% of
the records at each database is enough. In the worst-
case scenario where only one database is not colluding,
assuming there are 1000 users, we find the security pa-
rameter  is approximately equal to 10−1. However, if
only half of the databases are corrupted (i.e., da = 12 ·d),
we have  < 10−15. To summarize for d = 102, u = 103
and θ = 0.25, if da = d − 1 we have  ≈ 10−1 while if
da = d2 , we have  < 10
−15.
In the case of a small database system managing a
few to tens of databases we set d = 10. When the ad-
versary controls all databases but one, if there are 1000
users, each sending only one request per database, we
have the  ≈ 10−1 while when half of the databases are
corrupted, da = 12 · d, we have  ≈ 10−3. To summarize
for d = 10, u = 103 and θ = 0.25, if da = d− 1 we have
 ≈ 10−1 while if da = d2 , we have  ≈ 10−3.
Anonymous Sparse-PIR allows us to easily trade
off θ (which governs the server-side cost of the proto-
col) with u (the number of simultaneous users of the
database). If the number of users is high, then by com-
posing Sparse-PIR with an anonymity system, we can
reduce θ and still achieve a low .
5 Optimizing PIR
In this section, we propose an optimization for PIR sys-
tems to render them more scalable, but at a higher risk.
5.1 Subset-PIR
In order to lower both the communication and com-
putation costs, when d  1, one could consider doing
IT-PIR on a subset of just t of the databases. We call
this optimization Subset-PIR.
The communication and server side computation
costs are thus multiplied by a factor of td at the cost
of a greater risk of all contacted databases being com-
promised. Consequently, even if an IT-PIR scheme were
perfectly private, this optimization induces a non-zero
probability of the adversary being able to breach it.
Security Theorem 5. Subset-PIR is an (, δ)-private
PIR optimization with
 = 0 and δ =
t−1∏
i=0
da − i
d− i
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Algorithm 5.1: Subset-PIR (User)
Input:
Q: 0 ≤ Q < n;
t: 2 ≤ t ≤ d;
1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ t− 1 do
2 Pj ← n Bernoulli( 12 ) trials;
// eQ is the vector with all 0s except a
1 at position Q
3 Pt ←
(⊕t−1j=1Pj)⊕ eQ;
4 DB ← {};
5 while |DB| ≤ t do
6 server ← random(d);
7 if server /∈ DB then
8 DB ← DB ∪ {server};
9 for 1 ≤ j ≤ t do
10 respj ← sendreceive(DBDB[i], Pj);
11 return
⊕
i∈t respi;
where d is the total number of databases, of which da are
compromised and t ≤ da represents the number of PIR
servers contacted. When t > da the mechanism provides
unconditional privacy.
Proof. The probability of contacting t databases out of
which ta are compromised, knowing that there are in
total da compromised databases out of d is:
Pr (ta, t | da) =
(
da
ta
) · (d−dat−ta )(
d
t
)
The probability of contacting only compromised
databases is obtained by setting ta = t, and so is (
da
t )
(dt)
,
which equals
∏t−1
i=0
da−i
d−i if t ≤ da, and 0 if t > da.
Costs. For Subset-PIR, as we contact t databases, we
have Cm = t and using a Chor-like PIR protocol we
have the computation cost Cp = 12 · t · n · (cacc + cprc).
Practical values. Fig. 5 showns Subset-PIR curves
representing δ as a function of the number of databases
contacted t for different adversaries in the reference sce-
nario of Certificate Transparency, with d = 102. The se-
curity parameter δ starts between 10−1 and 1 and slowly
diminishes until a tenth to most of the databases have
been contacting depending on da where the curves fol-
low a vertical asymptote at t = d. The difference in
δ for different adversaries is noticeable at any point of
the curves. In order to achieve even a mediocre secu-
rity of δ < 10−1, excluding the worst case da = d − 1,
less than 20% of the databases have to be contacted.
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Fig. 5. Subset-PIR: δ versus t for d = 100.
In the worst-case scenario where only one database is
not colluding assuming the user contacts only a tenth
of the databases, we find the security parameter δ is ap-
proximately equal to 0.9. However if only half of the
databases are corrupted (i.e., da = 12 · d), we have
δ ≈ 10−4. To summarize for d = 102 and t = 110 · d,
if da = d − 1 we have δ ≈ 0.9 while if da = d2 , we have
δ ≈ 10−4.
In the case of a small database system managing
a few to tens of databases, each storing thousands of
records, we set d = 10. When the adversary controls all
databases but one, if the user contacts a tenth of the
databases, we have that δ ≈ 0.9 while when half of the
databases are corrupted, da = 12 · d, we have δ ≈ 0.5.
To summarize for d = 10 and t = 110 · d, if da = d − 1
we have δ ≈ 0.9 while if da = d2 , we have δ ≈ 0.5.
Perfectly private ( = 0) IT-PIR designs used in
conjunction with the Subset-PIR optimization become
(, δ)-private with  = 0 and δ reasonably small, if the
number of honest database servers is large.
6 Comparative Evaluation
In Table 1, we summarize for each scheme presented the
security parameters  and δ, the communication costs
Cm, the number of blocks sent back to the user, and the
computational cost Cp which depends on the access cost
cacc and the processing cost cprc; i.e., the cost associated
to the number of records XORed.
When the protocols are not fully private (i.e.,  6= 0),
we observe a reduction in the server computation costs.
The Sparse-PIR scheme diminishes the computation
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 δ Cm Cp
Chor PIR [10] 0 0 d 12 · d · n · (cacc + cprc)
Direct Requests ln
( 1
d−da ·
(
d · n−1
p−1 − da
))
0 p p · cacc
Sparse-PIR 4 · arctanh[(1− 2θ)(d−da)] 0 d θ · d · n · (cacc + cprc)
AS-Request ln
(
1
u
(
d
d−da ·
n−1
p−1 − dad−da
)2
+ u−1
u
)
0 p p · cacc
AS-Sparse-PIR ln
(
1
u
(
1+(1−2θ)(d−da)
1−(1−2θ)(d−da)
)4
+ u−1
u
)
0 d θ · d · n · (cacc + cprc)
Subset-PIR 0
∏t
i=0
da−i
d−i t
1
2 · t · n · (cacc + cprc)
Table 1. Security and Cost Summary of the Schemes
cost by a factor of 2 · θ compared to Chor PIR [10],
while the Direct Request schemes induce no record pro-
cessing. As the use of an anonymity system raises the
privacy level, the security parameter can be lowered to
reach the same privacy level of the schemes at the cost
of network delays. The Sparse-PIR methods do not in-
fluence the communication cost, but the Direct Request
schemes drastically increase it as the number of requests
p is a multiple of d.
The Subset-PIR optimization schemes helps scala-
bility by reducing all costs by a factor of td , but turns
-private protocols into (, δ)-private ones.
The two main approaches for decreasing the com-
putation are contacting fewer databases and accessing
(or processing) fewer records per server. It can be noted,
for example, that in order for Sparse-PIR to achieve a
similar level of computation to Subset-PIR with a given
t, the parameter θ must be particularly low, θ = t4·d .
The first approach would be relevant in the case of a
quasi-trusted database system while the second in the
case of a large untrusted one.
In Figure 6, we compare the computation cost Cp,
the number of records accessed, and the communication
cost Cm, the number of records sent, of the Direct Re-
quest and Sparse-PIR schemes, and their compositions
with an anonymity system, for a system comparable to
Certificate Transparency when the adversary controls
half of the databases. If the costs of the designs with an
anonymity system first appear greater than in the sim-
ple case, this can be explained by the lack of tightness
of the bound in the Composition Lemma. The gains of
the anonymity system can be seen by the values  takes
under the lines “DR” and “SP” which represent the last
security value respectively for the Direct Request and
Sparse-PIR designs without an anonymity system.
In Figures 6a and 6c, we show the privacy param-
eter  as a function of the whole database system com-
putation cost Cp and compare it between the two PIR
designs and their composition with an anonymity sys-
tem. For the Direct Request cases, Cp represents the
total number of records accessed p while for Sparse-PIR
ones this is the sum of the records accessed by each
database θ · d ·n. This difference is worth mentioning as
by definition a record can be accessed and sent only once
in the Direct Request cases, while in the Sparse-PIR
ones, a record can be accessed and processed at differ-
ent servers. Thus, the privacy level will converge to 0 for
p = d with the Direct Request protocols but for θ = 12 ,
or p = 12 ·d ·n in the graphs, with the Sparse-PIR proto-
cols. While both figures show  decreasing with Cp, the
Direct Request protocols perform better for a given Cp
than the Sparse-PIR ones which however appear more
flexible as the security parameter  can be selected in a
wider interval.
In Figures 6b and 6d, we show  as a function of
the number of records sent back by the whole database
system to the user and compare it between the PIR de-
signs and their compositions with an anonymity system.
While the privacy level does not depend on Cm for the
Sparse-PIR protocols, as the number of requests sent
and record received is a constant, Cm has to greatly
increase to reach an adequate  in the Direct Request
cases.
While the Direct Requests protocols present lower
computational costs than the Sparse-PIR ones, they
vastly increase the communication costs. This is not a
surprise as PIR was conceived in order to limit the com-
munication cost of private search in public databases.
Choosing which method to use thus depends on the
database system characteristics, not only the number of
database servers and the level of trust the user has, but
Lower Cost -Private PIR 14
10-12
10-10
10-8
10-6
10-4
10-2
100
102
100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108
ε
Computation Cost Cp
Direct Request
Sparse PIR
(a) Cp versus  for Direct Request (Cp = p)
and Sparse-PIR (Cp = θ · d · n).
10-12
10-10
10-8
10-6
10-4
10-2
100
102
100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108
ε
Communication Cost Cm
Direct Request
Sparse PIR
(b) Cm versus  for Direct Request (Cm = p)
and Sparse-PIR (Cm = d).
10-16
10-14
10-12
10-10
10-8
10-6
10-4
10-2
100
102
100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108
DR
SP
ε
Computation Cost Cp
AS-Direct Request
AS-Sparse PIR
(c) Cp versus  for AS-Direct Request (Cp = p)
and AS-Sparse-PIR (Cp = θ · d · n).
10-16
10-14
10-12
10-10
10-8
10-6
10-4
10-2
100
102
100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108
DR
SP
ε
Communication Cost Cm
AS-Direct Request
AS-Sparse PIR
(d) Cm versus  for AS-Direct Request (Cm = p)
and AS-Sparse-PIR (Cm = d).
Fig. 6. Parameterized plots for Direct Request and Sparse-PIR, AS-Direct Request, and AS-Sparse-PIR, for d = 102, da = d2 , n = 10
6,
and u = 103. The dots in the figures show the varying parameter p (for the Direct Request schemes) or θ (for the Sparse-PIR schemes).
also the hardware. One method can be used to counter
the system bottleneck, Sparse-PIR would suit servers
with fast processors while Direct Request would adapt
better with high-speed networks. As both processing
and networking capabilities are continually increasing,
the question of whether Direct Request schemes have a
future is still open.
7 Conclusions
We show that -private PIR can be instantiated by a
number of systems, using dummy queries, anonymous
channels, and variants of the classic Chor protocol. Yet
some popular naive designs based on dummies or anony-
mous channels alone fail to provide even this weaker
notion of privacy. We argue that the weaker protection
provided by -private PIR may be sufficient to provide
some privacy in systems that are so large in terms of
database size, but also so popular, that current IT-PIR
techniques are impossible to apply. With a large fraction
of honest servers even weak (but still -private) variants
of PIR, such as Sparse-PIR, provide near-perfect pri-
vacy. Showing that a system is -private enables smooth
composition with an anonymity system, which guaran-
tees that any anonymized -private PIR mechanism be-
comes near perfect given a large enough anonymity set.
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A Proofs of Theorems
A.1 Proof of Composing Naive
Mechanisms
Proof. We want to prove in our indistinguishability
game scenario that the probability the adversary ob-
serves exactly u queries Qi is bounded above by δu ≤(
p−1
n−1
)u−1 while the probability they receive no Qi
queries is bounded above by δ0 ≤
(
n−p
n−1
)u−1. We first
assume that the probability a user chooses one of the
two queries (Qi) given by the adversary is PrT .
The probability a non-target user selects this very
Qi out of his p − 1 randomly selected requests (the
pth one being the adversarially provided query Q0) is
(n−2p−2)
(n−1p−1)
= p−1n−1 as each record can only be requested once
by any given user. As each user is independent, the prob-
ability all the users select Qi is the product of the prob-
abilities, we thus have δu = PrT
(
p−1
n−1
)u−1. Similarly,
the probability a non-target user does not select this
very Qi out of his p − 1 randomly selected requests is
(n−2p−1)
(n−1p−1)
= n−pn−1 . As each user is independent, the proba-
bility none of the users selects Qi is the product of the
probabilities, so δ0 = PrT
(
n−p
n−1
)u−1 ≤ (n−pn−1)u−1, and
similarly for δu.
A.2 Proof of Security Theorem 1 (Direct
Requests)
Proof. We want to prove the following result.
L = P1P2 =
Pr(Observation | QTarget = Q1)
Pr(Observation | QTarget = Q2)
≤ 1
d− da ·
(
d · n− 1
p− 1 − da
)
We first note that the best observation for the ad-
versary is to see exactly one of the Qi, for instance Q1.
In the first case, the adversary supposes Q1 was
sent. Q2 may also have been sent, but in this case a
non-colluding database would have received it.
P1 = da
d
·
(
n− 1
p− 1
)−1
·
[(
n− 2
p− 1
)
+ d− da
d
·
(
n− 2
p− 2
)]
= da
d
·
(
n− 1
p− 1
)−1
·
[(
n− 1
p− 1
)
− da
d
·
(
n− 2
p− 2
)]
= da
d
·
[
1− da
d
· p− 1
n− 1
]
In the second case, the adversary supposes Q2 was
sent however she only sees Q1. Q2 must thus have been
received by a non-colluding database.
P2 = da
d
· d− da
d
·
(
n− 2
p− 2
)
·
(
n− 1
p− 1
)−1
= da
d
· d− da
d
· p− 1
n− 1
Therefore we obtain the result:
L = P1P2 ≤
da
d ·
[
1− dad · p−1n−1
]
da
d · d−dad · p−1n−1
≤ d
d− da ·
n− 1
p− 1 −
da
d− da
≤ 1
d− da ·
(
d · n− 1
p− 1 − da
)
This concludes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Security Theorem 2
(Sparse-PIR)
Proof. We represent the p requests sent by the user by
{0, 1}1×n vectors listed in a d× n matrix, each column
representing a record and each row a request. The ad-
versary A controlling only a set of the databases will
only see some of the rows. A is interested in the number
of ones in the columns, these numbers representing how
many times each record has been requested.
We first note that the probability an (d, θ)-Binomial
variable is even is 12 +
1
2 (1− 2θ)d. [27]
The adversary observes only the part of each column
vi corresponding to the corrupt servers da. We call the
adversary observation for column i, oi, and the hidden
part of the vector hi. Without loss of generality we con-
sider that vi ← oi|hi namely that the column for entry
i is the concatenation of the observed and the hidden
part of the column.
We denote the event the user queried for record α
as Qα. For such a query our mechanism would set the
column α, namely vα, to have odd Hamming weight,
and all other column vβ , β 6= α to have even Hamming
weight.
To prove that the mechanism is differentially private
we need to show that:
Pr[∀i.oi|Qα]
Pr[∀i.oi|Qβ ] ≤ e

However, each column of the query is sampled indepen-
dently of all others, and thus it suffices to prove that:∏
∀i. Pr[oi|Qα]∏
∀i. Pr[oi|Qβ ]
≤ e
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Since Pr[oi|Qα]/Pr[oi|Qβ ] = 1 for i /∈ {α, β}, this ex-
pression simplifies to:
Pr[oα|Qα] · Pr[oβ |Qα]
Pr[oα|Qβ ] · Pr[oβ |Qβ ] ≤ e

We have the following cases depending on the observed
parity of oi, based on the expected parity of the full,
and partly unobserved, vi and vj :
Pr[oi odd|Qi] = Pr[hi even]
Pr[oi even|Qi] = Pr[hi odd] = 1− Pr[hi even]
Pr[oj odd|Qi] = Pr[hj odd] = 1− Pr[hj even]
Pr[oj even|Qi] = Pr[hj even]
For values of θ < 1/2, it is the case that
Pr[hi even] > Pr[hi odd] and the differential privacy
bound is minimized for:
Pr[oα odd|Qα] · Pr[oβ even|Qα]
Pr[oα odd|Qβ ] · Pr[oβ even|Qβ ] =
Pr[hα even] · Pr[hβ even]
Pr[hα odd] · Pr[hβ odd] =
Pr[hα even]2
Pr[hα odd]2
=(
1/2 + 1/2(1− 2θ)|hi|
1− (1/2 + 1/2(1− 2θ)|hi|)
)2
=(
1 + (1− 2θ)|hi|
1− (1− 2θ)|hi|
)2
The value of  such that this expression is bounded
above by e can be expressed in terms of an inverse
hyperbolic tangent (arctanh x = 12 ln
( 1+x
1−x
)
; |x| < 1):
 = 4 · arctanh(1− 2θ)|hi|
This concludes the proof and the upper bound is tight.
A.4 Proof of the Composition Lemma
Proof. We consider the observations O0 . . .Ou−1 as
originating from the 1-private PIR mechanism used by
users U0 to Uu−1 respectively. Without loss of generality
we consider the target user Ut is U0. We try to determine
a bound on the following quantity to prove -privacy:
Pr(O0 . . .Ou−1|Qi, Q0 . . . Q0)
Pr(O0 . . .Ou−1|Qj , Q0 . . . Q0) ≤ e
2
However, due to the use of the anonymity system the
adversary has a uniform belief about the matching of
all observations to all queries, out of the u! possible
matchings. Thus we have that:
Pr(O0 . . .Ou−1|Qx, Q0 . . . Q0) =
= 1
u!
u−1∑
i=0
(u− 1)! Pr(Oi|Qx)
∏
j 6=i
Pr(Oj |Q0)
= 1
u
u−1∑
i=0
Pr(Oi|Qx)
∏
j 6=i
Pr(Oj |Q0)
The quantity to be bound can therefore be re-
written as:
1
u
∑u−1
i=0 Pr(Oi|Qa)
∏
j 6=i Pr(Oj |Q0)
1
u
∑u−1
i=0 Pr(Oi|Qb)
∏
j 6=i Pr(Oj |Q0)
=
Pr(O0|Qa)
∏
j 6=0 Pr(Oj |Q0) +
∑
i 6=0 Pr(Oi|Qa)
∏
j 6=i Pr(Oj |Q0)∑u−1
i=0 Pr(Oi|Qb)
∏
j 6=i Pr(Oj |Q0)
We are now making a simplifying assumption: We
consider that Pr(Oi|Qx) = µ if the observation Oi was
indeed produced by the query Qx, an ν otherwise, and
also µ > ν. Since the PIR mechanism is -private we
know that µ ≤ e1ν. This simplifying assumption holds
for large numbers of u, since products of multiple indi-
vidual Pr(Oi|Qx) will tend to be products of the average
µ and ν.
The quantity to be bound now reduces to:
µ2µu−2 + (u− 1)ν2µu−2
ν2µu−2 + (u− 1)ν2µu−2 =
µ2 + (u− 1)ν2
uν2
=(
µ
ν
)2 + u− 1
u
≤
(e1)2 + u− 1
u
=
eln(e
21+u−1)−lnu
This concludes the proof.
